Nicomachean Ethics

第4章

Inthevariableareincludedboththingsmadeandthingsdone；

makingandactingaredifferent(fortheirnaturewetreateventhediscussionsoutsideourschoolasreliable)；sothatthereasonedstateofcapacitytoactisdifferentfromthereasonedstateofcapacitytomake。Hencetootheyarenotincludedoneintheother；

forneitherisactingmakingnorismakingacting。Nowsincearchitectureisanartandisessentiallyareasonedstateofcapacitytomake，andthereisneitheranyartthatisnotsuchastatenoranysuchstatethatisnotanart，artisidenticalwithastateofcapacitytomake，involvingatruecourseofreasoning。Allartisconcernedwithcomingintobeing，i。e。withcontrivingandconsideringhowsomethingmaycomeintobeingwhichiscapableofeitherbeingornotbeing，andwhoseoriginisinthemakerandnotinthethingmade；forartisconcernedneitherwiththingsthatare，orcomeintobeing，bynecessity，norwiththingsthatdosoinaccordancewithnature(sincethesehavetheirorigininthemselves)。Makingandactingbeingdifferent，artmustbeamatterofmaking，notofacting。Andinasensechanceandartareconcernedwiththesameobjects；asAgathonsays，\'artloveschanceandchancelovesart\'。

Art，then，ashasbeenisastateconcernedwithmaking，involvingatruecourseofreasoning，andlackofartonthecontraryisastateconcernedwithmaking，involvingafalsecourseofreasoning；bothareconcernedwiththevariable。

Regardingpracticalwisdomweshallgetatthetruthbyconsideringwhoarethepersonswecreditwithit。Nowitisthoughttobethemarkofamanofpracticalwisdomtobeabletodeliberatewellaboutwhatisgoodandexpedientforhimself，notinsomeparticularrespect，e。g。aboutwhatsortsofthingconducetohealthortostrength，butaboutwhatsortsofthingconducetothegoodlifeingeneral。Thisisshownbythefactthatwecreditmenwithpracticalwisdominsomeparticularrespectwhentheyhavecalculatedwellwithaviewtosomegoodendwhichisoneofthosethatarenottheobjectofanyart。Itfollowsthatinthegeneralsensealsothemanwhoiscapableofdeliberatinghaspracticalwisdom。Nownoonedeliberatesaboutthingsthatareinvariable，noraboutthingsthatitisimpossibleforhimtodo。Therefore，sincescientificknowledgeinvolvesdemonstration，butthereisnodemonstrationofthingswhosefirstprinciplesarevariable(forallsuchthingsmightactuallybeotherwise)，andsinceitisimpossibletodeliberateaboutthingsthatareofnecessity，practicalwisdomcannotbescientificknowledgenorart；notsciencebecausethatwhichcanbedoneiscapableofbeingotherwise，notartbecauseactionandmakingaredifferentkindsofthing。Theremainingalternative，then，isthatitisatrueandreasonedstateofcapacitytoactwithregardtothethingsthataregoodorbadforman。Forwhilemakinghasanendotherthanitself，actioncannot；forgoodactionitselfisitsend。ItisforthisreasonthatwethinkPericlesandmenlikehimhavepracticalwisdom，viz。becausetheycanseewhatisgoodforthemselvesandwhatisgoodformeningeneral；weconsiderthatthosecandothiswhoaregoodatmanaginghouseholdsorstates。(Thisiswhywecalltemperance(sophrosune)bythisname；

weimplythatitpreservesone\'spracticalwisdom(sozousatanphronsin)。Nowwhatitpreservesisajudgementofthekindwehavedescribed。Foritisnotanyandeveryjudgementthatpleasantandpainfulobjectsdestroyandpervert，e。g。thejudgementthatthetrianglehasorhasnotitsanglesequaltotworightangles，butonlyjudgementsaboutwhatistobedone。Fortheoriginatingcausesofthethingsthataredoneconsistintheendatwhichtheyareaimed；butthemanwhohasbeenruinedbypleasureorpainforthwithfailstoseeanysuchoriginatingcause-toseethatforthesakeofthisorbecauseofthisheoughttochooseanddowhateverhechoosesanddoes；forviceisdestructiveoftheoriginatingcauseofaction。)Practicalwisdom，then，mustbeareasonedandtruestateofcapacitytoactwithregardtohumangoods。Butfurther，whilethereissuchathingasexcellenceinart，thereisnosuchthingasexcellenceinpracticalwisdom；andinarthewhoerrswillinglyispreferable，butinpracticalwisdom，asinthevirtues，heisthereverse。

Plainly，then，practicalwisdomisavirtueandnotanart。Therebeingtwopartsofthesoulthatcanfollowacourseofreasoning，itmustbethevirtueofoneofthetwo，i。e。ofthatpartwhichformsopinions；foropinionisaboutthevariableandsoispracticalwisdom。Butyetitisnotonlyareasonedstate；thisisshownbythefactthatastateofthatsortmayforgottenbutpracticalwisdomcannot。

Scientificknowledgeisjudgementaboutthingsthatareuniversalandnecessary，andtheconclusionsofdemonstration，andallscientificknowledge，followfromfirstprinciples(forscientificknowledgeinvolvesapprehensionofarationalground)。Thisbeingso，thefirstprinciplefromwhichwhatisscientificallyknownfollowscannotbeanobjectofscientificknowledge，ofart，orofpracticalwisdom；forthatwhichcanbescientificallyknowncanbedemonstrated，andartandpracticalwisdomdealwiththingsthatarevariable。Norarethesefirstprinciplestheobjectsofphilosophicwisdom，foritisamarkofthephilosophertohavedemonstrationaboutsomethings。If，then，thestatesofmindbywhichwehavetruthandareneverdeceivedaboutthingsinvariableorevenvariablearescientificknowlededge，practicalwisdom，philosophicwisdom，andintuitivereason，anditcannotbeanyofthethree(i。e。practicalwisdom，scientificknowledge，orphilosophicwisdom)，theremainingalternativeisthatitisintuitivereasonthatgraspsthefirstprinciples。

Wisdom(1)intheartsweascribetotheirmostfinishedexponents，e。g。toPhidiasasasculptorandtoPolyclitusasamakerofportrait-statues，andherewemeannothingbywisdomexceptexcellenceinart；but(2)wethinkthatsomepeoplearewiseingeneral，notinsomeparticularfieldorinanyotherlimitedrespect，asHomersaysintheMargites，HimdidthegodsmakeneitheradiggernoryetaploughmanNorwiseinanythingelse。

Thereforewisdommustplainlybethemostfinishedoftheformsofknowledge。Itfollowsthatthewisemanmustnotonlyknowwhatfollowsfromthefirstprinciples，butmustalsopossesstruthaboutthefirstprinciples。Thereforewisdommustbeintuitivereasoncombinedwithscientificknowledge-scientificknowledgeofthehighestobjectswhichhasreceivedasitwereitspropercompletion。

Ofthehighestobjects，wesay；foritwouldbestrangetothinkthattheartofpolitics，orpracticalwisdom，isthebestknowledge，sincemanisnotthebestthingintheworld。Nowifwhatishealthyorgoodisdifferentformenandforfishes，butwhatiswhiteorstraightisalwaysthesame，anyonewouldsaythatwhatiswiseisthesamebutwhatispracticallywiseisdifferent；foritistothatwhichobserveswellthevariousmattersconcerningitselfthatoneascribespracticalwisdom，anditistothisthatonewillentrustsuchmatters。Thisiswhywesaythatsomeevenoftheloweranimalshavepracticalwisdom，viz。thosewhicharefoundtohaveapowerofforesightwithregardtotheirownlife。Itisevidentalsothatphilosophicwisdomandtheartofpoliticscannotbethesame；

forifthestateofmindconcernedwithaman\'sowninterestsistobecalledphilosophicwisdom，therewillbemanyphilosophicwisdoms；

therewillnotbeoneconcernedwiththegoodofallanimals(anymorethanthereisoneartofmedicineforallexistingthings)，butadifferentphilosophicwisdomaboutthegoodofeachspecies。

Butiftheargumentbethatmanisthebestoftheanimals，thismakesnodifference；forthereareotherthingsmuchmoredivineintheirnatureeventhanman，e。g。，mostconspicuously，thebodiesofwhichtheheavensareframed。Fromwhathasbeensaiditisplain，then，thatphilosophicwisdomisscientificknowledge，combinedwithintuitivereason，ofthethingsthatarehighestbynature。ThisiswhywesayAnaxagoras，Thales，andmenlikethemhavephilosophicbutnotpracticalwisdom，whenweseethemignorantofwhatistotheirownadvantage，andwhywesaythattheyknowthingsthatareremarkable，admirable，difficult，anddivine，butuseless；viz。

becauseitisnothumangoodsthattheyseek。

Practicalwisdomontheotherhandisconcernedwiththingshumanandthingsaboutwhichitispossibletodeliberate；forwesaythisisabovealltheworkofthemanofpracticalwisdom，todeliberatewell，butnoonedeliberatesaboutthingsinvariable，noraboutthingswhichhavenotanend，andthatagoodthatcanbebroughtaboutbyaction。Themanwhoiswithoutqualificationgoodatdeliberatingisthemanwhoiscapableofaiminginaccordancewithcalculationatthebestformanofthingsattainablebyaction。Norispracticalwisdomconcernedwithuniversalsonly-itmustalsorecognizetheparticulars；

foritispractical，andpracticeisconcernedwithparticulars。

Thisiswhysomewhodonotknow，andespeciallythosewhohaveexperience，aremorepracticalthanotherswhoknow；forifamanknewthatlightmeatsaredigestibleandwholesome，butdidnotknowwhichsortsofmeatarelight，hewouldnotproducehealth，butthemanwhoknowsthatchickeniswholesomeismorelikelytoproducehealth。

Nowpracticalwisdomisconcernedwithaction；thereforeoneshouldhavebothformsofit，orthelatterinpreferencetotheformer。Butofpracticalasofphilosophicwisdomtheremustbeacontrollingkind。

Politicalwisdomandpracticalwisdomarethesamestateofmind，buttheiressenceisnotthesame。Ofthewisdomconcernedwiththecity，thepracticalwisdomwhichplaysacontrollingpartislegislativewisdom，whilethatwhichisrelatedtothisasparticularstotheiruniversalisknownbythegeneralname\'politicalwisdom\'；

thishastodowithactionanddeliberation，foradecreeisathingtobecarriedoutintheformofanindividualact。Thisiswhytheexponentsofthisartarealonesaidto\'takepartinpolitics\'；forthesealone\'dothings\'asmanuallabourers\'dothings\'。

Practicalwisdomalsoisidentifiedespeciallywiththatformofitwhichisconcernedwithamanhimself-withtheindividual；andthisisknownbythegeneralname\'practicalwisdom\'；oftheotherkindsoneiscalledhouseholdmanagement，anotherlegislation，thethirdpolitics，andofthelatteronepartiscalleddeliberativeandtheotherjudicial。Nowknowingwhatisgoodforoneselfwillbeonekindofknowledge，butitisverydifferentfromtheotherkinds；

andthemanwhoknowsandconcernshimselfwithhisowninterestsisthoughttohavepracticalwisdom，whilepoliticiansarethoughttobebusybodies；hencethewordofEuripides，ButhowcouldIbewise，whomightatease，Numberedamongthearmy\'smultitude，Havehadanequalshare？

Forthosewhoaimtoohighanddotoomuch。

Thosewhothinkthusseektheirowngood，andconsiderthatoneoughttodoso。Fromthisopinion，then，hascometheviewthatsuchmenhavepracticalwisdom；yetperhapsone\'sowngoodcannotexistwithouthouseholdmanagement，norwithoutaformofgovernment。

Further，howoneshouldorderone\'sownaffairsisnotclearandneedsinquiry。

Whathasbeensaidisconfirmedbythefactthatwhileyoungmenbecomegeometriciansandmathematiciansandwiseinmatterslikethese，itisthoughtthatayoungmanofpracticalwisdomcannotbefound。Thecauseisthatsuchwisdomisconcernednotonlywithuniversalsbutwithparticulars，whichbecomefamiliarfromexperience，butayoungmanhasnoexperience，foritislengthoftimethatgivesexperience；indeedonemightaskthisquestiontoo，whyaboymaybecomeamathematician，butnotaphilosopheroraphysicist。Itisbecausetheobjectsofmathematicsexistbyabstraction，whilethefirstprinciplesoftheseothersubjectscomefromexperience，andbecauseyoungmenhavenoconvictionaboutthelatterbutmerelyusetheproperlanguage，whiletheessenceofmathematicalobjectsisplainenoughtothem？

Further，errorindeliberationmaybeeitherabouttheuniversalorabouttheparticular；wemayfalltoknoweitherthatallwaterthatweighsheavyisbad，orthatthisparticularwaterweighsheavy。

Thatpracticalwisdomisnotscientificknowledgeisevident；foritis，ashasbeensaid，concernedwiththeultimateparticularfact，sincethethingtobedoneisofthisnature。Itisopposed，then，tointuitivereason；forintuitivereasonisofthelimitingpremisses，forwhichnoreasoncanbegiven，whilepracticalwisdomisconcernedwiththeultimateparticular，whichistheobjectnotofscientificknowledgebutofperception-nottheperceptionofqualitiespeculiartoonesensebutaperceptionakintothatbywhichweperceivethattheparticularfigurebeforeusisatriangle；forinthatdirectionaswellasinthatofthemajorpremisstherewillbealimit。Butthisisratherperceptionthanpracticalwisdom，thoughitisanotherkindofperceptionthanthatofthequalitiespeculiartoeachsense。

Thereisadifferencebetweeninquiryanddeliberation；fordeliberationisinquiryintoaparticularkindofthing。Wemustgraspthenatureofexcellenceindeliberationaswellwhetheritisaformofscientificknowledge，oropinion，orskillinconjecture，orsomeotherkindofthing。Scientificknowledgeitisnot；formendonotinquireaboutthethingstheyknowabout，butgooddeliberationisakindofdeliberation，andhewhodeliberatesinquiresandcalculates。Norisitskillinconjecture；forthisbothinvolvesnoreasoningandissomethingthatisquickinitsoperation，whilemendeliberatealongtime，andtheysaythatoneshouldcarryoutquicklytheconclusionsofone\'sdeliberation，butshoulddeliberateslowly。

Again，readinessofmindisdifferentfromexcellenceindeliberation；

itisasortofskillinconjecture。Noragainisexcellenceindeliberationopinionofanysort。Butsincethemanwhodeliberatesbadlymakesamistake，whilehewhodeliberateswelldoessocorrectly，excellenceindeliberationisclearlyakindofcorrectness，butneitherofknowledgenorofopinion；forthereisnosuchthingascorrectnessofknowledge(sincethereisnosuchthingaserrorofknowledge)，andcorrectnessofopinionistruth；andatthesametimeeverythingthatisanobjectofopinionisalreadydetermined。Butagainexcellenceindeliberationinvolvesreasoning。

Theremainingalternative，then，isthatitiscorrectnessofthinking；forthisisnotyetassertion，since，whileevenopinionisnotinquirybuthasreachedthestageofassertion，themanwhoisdeliberating，whetherhedoessowellorill，issearchingforsomethingandcalculating。

Butexcellenceindeliberationisacertaincorrectnessofdeliberation；hencewemustfirstinquirewhatdeliberationisandwhatitisabout。And，therebeingmorethanonekindofcorrectness，plainlyexcellenceindeliberationisnotanyandeverykind；for(1)theincontinentmanandthebadman，ifheisclever，willreachasaresultofhiscalculationwhathesetsbeforehimself，sothathewillhavedeliberatedcorrectly，buthewillhavegotforhimselfagreatevil。Nowtohavedeliberatedwellisthoughttobeagoodthing；foritisthiskindofcorrectnessofdeliberationthatisexcellenceindeliberation，viz。thatwhichtendstoattainwhatisgood。But(2)itispossibletoattainevengoodbyafalsesyllogism，andtoattainwhatoneoughttodobutnotbytherightmeans，themiddletermbeingfalse；sothatthistooisnotyetexcellenceindeliberationthisstateinvirtueofwhichoneattainswhatoneoughtbutnotbytherightmeans。Again(3)itispossibletoattainitbylongdeliberationwhileanothermanattainsitquickly。

Thereforeintheformercasewehavenotyetgotexcellenceindeliberation，whichisrightnesswithregardtotheexpedient-rightnessinrespectbothoftheend，themanner，andthetime。(4)Furtheritispossibletohavedeliberatedwelleitherintheunqualifiedsenseorwithreferencetoaparticularend。

Excellenceindeliberationintheunqualifiedsense，then，isthatwhichsucceedswithreferencetowhatistheendintheunqualifiedsense，andexcellenceindeliberationinaparticularsenseisthatwhichsucceedsrelativelytoaparticularend。If，then，itischaracteristicofmenofpracticalwisdomtohavedeliberatedwell，excellenceindeliberationwillbecorrectnesswithregardtowhatconducestotheendofwhichpracticalwisdomisthetrueapprehension。

Understanding，also，andgoodnessofunderstanding，invirtueofwhichmenaresaidtobemenofunderstandingorofgoodunderstanding，areneitherentirelythesameasopinionorscientificknowledge(foratthatrateallmenwouldhavebeenmenofunderstanding)，noraretheyoneoftheparticularsciences，suchasmedicine，thescienceofthingsconnectedwithhealth，orgeometry，thescienceofspatialmagnitudes。Forunderstandingisneitheraboutthingsthatarealwaysandareunchangeable，noraboutanyandeveryoneofthethingsthatcomeintobeing，butaboutthingswhichmaybecomesubjectsofquestioninganddeliberation。Henceitisaboutthesameobjectsaspracticalwisdom；butunderstandingandpracticalwisdomarenotthesame。Forpracticalwisdomissuescommands，sinceitsendiswhatoughttobedoneornottobedone；

butunderstandingonlyjudges。(Understandingisidenticalwithgoodnessofunderstanding，menofunderstandingwithmenofgoodunderstanding。)Nowunderstandingisneitherthehavingnortheacquiringofpracticalwisdom；butaslearningiscalledunderstandingwhenitmeanstheexerciseofthefacultyofknowledge，so\'understanding\'isapplicabletotheexerciseofthefacultyofopinionforthepurposeofjudgingofwhatsomeoneelsesaysaboutmatterswithwhichpracticalwisdomisconcerned-andofjudgingsoundly；for\'well\'and\'soundly\'arethesamething。Andfromthishascometheuseofthename\'understanding\'invirtueofwhichmenaresaidtobe\'ofgoodunderstanding\'，viz。fromtheapplicationofthewordtothegraspingofscientifictruth；forweoftencallsuchgraspingunderstanding。

Whatiscalledjudgement，invirtueofwhichmenaresaidto\'besympatheticjudges\'andto\'havejudgement\'，istherightdiscriminationoftheequitable。Thisisshownbythefactthatwesaytheequitablemanisaboveallothersamanofsympatheticjudgement，andidentifyequitywithsympatheticjudgementaboutcertainfacts。Andsympatheticjudgementisjudgementwhichdiscriminateswhatisequitableanddoessocorrectly；andcorrectjudgementisthatwhichjudgeswhatistrue。

Nowallthestateswehaveconsideredconverge，asmightbeexpected，tothesamepoint；forwhenwespeakofjudgementandunderstandingandpracticalwisdomandintuitivereasonwecreditthesamepeoplewithpossessingjudgementandhavingreachedyearsofreasonandwithhavingpracticalwisdomandunderstanding。Forallthesefacultiesdealwithultimates，i。e。withparticulars；andbeingamanofunderstandingandofgoodorsympatheticjudgementconsistsinbeingablejudgeaboutthethingswithwhichpracticalwisdomisconcerned；fortheequitiesarecommontoallgoodmeninrelationtoothermen。Nowallthingswhichhavetobedoneareincludedamongparticularsorultimates；fornotonlymustthemanofpracticalwisdomknowparticularfacts，butunderstandingandjudgementarealsoconcernedwiththingstobedone，andtheseareultimates。Andintuitivereasonisconcernedwiththeultimatesinbothdirections；forboththefirsttermsandthelastareobjectsofintuitivereasonandnotofargument，andtheintuitivereasonwhichispresupposedbydemonstrationsgraspstheunchangeableandfirstterms，whiletheintuitivereasoninvolvedinpracticalreasoningsgraspsthelastandvariablefact，i。e。theminorpremiss。Forthesevariablefactsarethestarting-pointsfortheapprehensionoftheend，sincetheuniversalsarereachedfromtheparticulars；ofthesethereforewemusthaveperception，andthisperceptionisintuitivereason。

Thisiswhythesestatesarethoughttobenaturalendowments-why，whilenooneisthoughttobeaphilosopherbynature，peoplearethoughttohavebynaturejudgement，understanding，andintuitivereason。Thisisshownbythefactthatwethinkourpowerscorrespondtoourtimeoflife，andthataparticularagebringswithitintuitivereasonandjudgement；thisimpliesthatnatureisthecause。(Henceintuitivereasonisbothbeginningandend；fordemonstrationsarefromtheseandaboutthese。)Thereforeweoughttoattendtotheundemonstratedsayingsandopinionsofexperiencedandolderpeopleorofpeopleofpracticalwisdomnotlessthantodemonstrations；forbecauseexperiencehasgiventhemaneyetheyseearight。

Wehavestated，then，whatpracticalandphilosophicwisdomare，andwithwhateachofthemisconcerned，andwehavesaidthateachisthevirtueofadifferentpartofthesoul。

Difficultiesmightberaisedastotheutilityofthesequalitiesofmind。For(1)philosophicwisdomwillcontemplatenoneofthethingsthatwillmakeamanhappy(foritisnotconcernedwithanycomingintobeing)，andthoughpracticalwisdomhasthismerit，forwhatpurposedoweneedit？Practicalwisdomisthequalityofmindconcernedwiththingsjustandnobleandgoodforman，butthesearethethingswhichitisthemarkofagoodmantodo，andwearenonethemoreabletoactforknowingthemifthevirtuesarestatesofcharacter，justaswearenonethebetterabletoactforknowingthethingsthatarehealthyandsound，inthesensenotofproducingbutofissuingfromthestateofhealth；forwearenonethemoreabletoactforhavingtheartofmedicineorofgymnastics。But(2)ifwearetosaythatamanshouldhavepracticalwisdomnotforthesakeofknowingmoraltruthsbutforthesakeofbecominggood，practicalwisdomwillbeofnousetothosewhoaregood；againitisofnousetothosewhohavenotvirtue；foritwillmakenodifferencewhethertheyhavepracticalwisdomthemselvesorobeyotherswhohaveit，anditwouldbeenoughforustodowhatwedointhecaseofhealth；thoughwewishtobecomehealthy，yetwedonotlearntheartofmedicine。(3)Besidesthis，itwouldbethoughtstrangeifpracticalwisdom，beinginferiortophilosophicwisdom，istobeputinauthorityoverit，asseemstobeimpliedbythefactthattheartwhichproducesanythingrulesandissuescommandsaboutthatthing。

These，then，arethequestionswemustdiscuss；sofarwehaveonlystatedthedifficulties。

(1)Nowfirstletussaythatinthemselvesthesestatesmustbeworthyofchoicebecausetheyarethevirtuesofthetwopartsofthesoulrespectively，evenifneitherofthemproduceanything。

(2)Secondly，theydoproducesomething，notastheartofmedicineproduceshealth，however，butashealthproduceshealth；sodoesphilosophicwisdomproducehappiness；for，beingapartofvirtueentire，bybeingpossessedandbyactualizingitselfitmakesamanhappy。

(3)Again，theworkofmanisachievedonlyinaccordancewithpracticalwisdomaswellaswithmoralvirtue；forvirtuemakesusaimattherightmark，andpracticalwisdommakesustaketherightmeans。

(Ofthefourthpartofthesoul-thenutritive-thereisnosuchvirtue；

forthereisnothingwhichitisinitspowertodoornottodo。)

(4)Withregardtoourbeingnonethemoreabletodobecauseofourpracticalwisdomwhatisnobleandjust，letusbeginalittlefurtherback，startingwiththefollowingprinciple。Aswesaythatsomepeoplewhodojustactsarenotnecessarilyjust，i。e。thosewhodotheactsordainedbythelawseitherunwillinglyorowingtoignoranceorforsomeotherreasonandnotforthesakeoftheactsthemselves(though，tobesure，theydowhattheyshouldandallthethingsthatthegoodmanought)，soisit，itseems，thatinordertobegoodonemustbeinacertainstatewhenonedoestheseveralacts，i。e。

onemustdothemasaresultofchoiceandforthesakeoftheactsthemselves。Nowvirtuemakesthechoiceright，butthequestionofthethingswhichshouldnaturallybedonetocarryoutourchoicebelongsnottovirtuebuttoanotherfaculty。Wemustdevoteourattentiontothesemattersandgiveaclearerstatementaboutthem。

Thereisafacultywhichiscalledcleverness；andthisissuchastobeabletodothethingsthattendtowardsthemarkwehavesetbeforeourselves，andtohitit。Nowifthemarkbenoble，theclevernessislaudable，butifthemarkbebad，theclevernessismeresmartness；hencewecallevenmenofpracticalwisdomcleverorsmart。

Practicalwisdomisnotthefaculty，butitdoesnotexistwithoutthisfaculty。Andthiseyeofthesoulacquiresitsformedstatenotwithouttheaidofvirtue，ashasbeensaidandisplain；forthesyllogismswhichdealwithactstobedonearethingswhichinvolveastarting-point，viz。\'sincetheend，i。e。whatisbest，isofsuchandsuchanature\'，whateveritmaybe(letitforthesakeofargumentbewhatweplease)；andthisisnotevidentexcepttothegoodman；forwickednesspervertsusandcausesustobedeceivedaboutthestarting-pointsofaction。Thereforeitisevidentthatitisimpossibletobepracticallywisewithoutbeinggood。

Wemustthereforeconsidervirtuealsooncemore；forvirtuetooissimilarlyrelated；aspracticalwisdomistocleverness-notthesame，butlikeit-soisnaturalvirtuetovirtueinthestrictsense。Forallmenthinkthateachtypeofcharacterbelongstoitspossessorsinsomesensebynature；forfromtheverymomentofbirthwearejustorfittedforselfcontrolorbraveorhavetheothermoralqualities；butyetweseeksomethingelseasthatwhichisgoodinthestrictsense-weseekforthepresenceofsuchqualitiesinanotherway。Forbothchildrenandbruteshavethenaturaldispositionstothesequalities，butwithoutreasontheseareevidentlyhurtful。Onlyweseemtoseethismuch，that，whileonemaybeledastraybythem，asastrongbodywhichmoveswithoutsightmaystumblebadlybecauseofitslackofsight，still，ifamanonceacquiresreason，thatmakesadifferenceinaction；andhisstate，whilestilllikewhatitwas，willthenbevirtueinthestrictsense。Therefore，asinthepartofuswhichformsopinionstherearetwotypes，clevernessandpracticalwisdom，sotoointhemoralparttherearetwotypes，naturalvirtueandvirtueinthestrictsense，andofthesethelatterinvolvespracticalwisdom。Thisiswhysomesaythatallthevirtuesareformsofpracticalwisdom，andwhySocratesinonerespectwasontherighttrackwhileinanotherhewentastray；inthinkingthatallthevirtueswereformsofpracticalwisdomhewaswrong，butinsayingtheyimpliedpracticalwisdomhewasright。Thisisconfirmedbythefactthatevennowallmen，whentheydefinevirtue，afternamingthestateofcharacteranditsobjectsadd\'that(state)whichisinaccordancewiththerightrule\'；nowtherightruleisthatwhichisinaccordancewithpracticalwisdom。Allmen，then，seemsomehowtodivinethatthiskindofstateisvirtue，viz。thatwhichisinaccordancewithpracticalwisdom。Butwemustgoalittlefurther。Foritisnotmerelythestateinaccordancewiththerightrule，butthestatethatimpliesthepresenceoftherightrule，thatisvirtue；andpracticalwisdomisarightruleaboutsuchmatters。Socrates，then，thoughtthevirtueswererulesorrationalprinciples(forhethoughttheywere，allofthem，formsofscientificknowledge)，whilewethinktheyinvolvearationalprinciple。

Itisclear，then，fromwhathasbeensaid，thatitisnotpossibletobegoodinthestrictsensewithoutpracticalwisdom，norpracticallywisewithoutmoralvirtue。Butinthiswaywemayalsorefutethedialecticalargumentwherebyitmightbecontendedthatthevirtuesexistinseparationfromeachother；thesameman，itmightbesaid，isnotbestequippedbynatureforallthevirtues，sothathewillhavealreadyacquiredonewhenhehasnotyetacquiredanother。

Thisispossibleinrespectofthenaturalvirtues，butnotinrespectofthoseinrespectofwhichamaniscalledwithoutqualificationgood；forwiththepresenceoftheonequality，practicalwisdom，willbegivenallthevirtues。Anditisplainthat，evenifitwereofnopracticalvalue，weshouldhaveneededitbecauseitisthevirtueofthepartofusinquestion；plaintoothatthechoicewillnotberightwithoutpracticalwisdomanymorethanwithoutvirtue；

fortheonedeter，minestheendandtheothermakesusdothethingsthatleadtotheend。

Butagainitisnotsupremeoverphilosophicwisdom，i。e。overthesuperiorpartofus，anymorethantheartofmedicineisoverhealth；

foritdoesnotuseitbutprovidesforitscomingintobeing；itissuesorders，then，foritssake，butnottoit。Further，tomaintainitssupremacywouldbelikesayingthattheartofpoliticsrulesthegodsbecauseitissuesordersaboutalltheaffairsofthestate。

BOOKVII

LETusnowmakeafreshbeginningandpointoutthatofmoralstatestobeavoidedtherearethreekinds-vice，incontinence，brutishness。

Thecontrariesoftwooftheseareevident，-onewecallvirtue，theothercontinence；tobrutishnessitwouldbemostfittingtoopposesuperhumanvirtue，aheroicanddivinekindofvirtue，asHomerhasrepresentedPriamsayingofHectorthathewasverygood，Forheseemednot，he，Thechildofamortalman，butasonethatofGod\'sseedcame。

Thereforeif，astheysay，menbecomegodsbyexcessofvirtue，ofthiskindmustevidentlybethestateopposedtothebrutishstate；

forasabrutehasnoviceorvirtue，soneitherhasagod；hisstateishigherthanvirtue，andthatofabruteisadifferentkindofstatefromvice。

Now，sinceitisrarelythatagodlikemanisfound-tousetheepithetoftheSpartans，whowhentheyadmireanyonehighlycallhima\'godlikeman\'-sotoothebrutishtypeisrarelyfoundamongmen；

itisfoundchieflyamongbarbarians，butsomebrutishqualitiesarealsoproducedbydiseaseordeformity；andwealsocallbythisevilnamethosemenwhogobeyondallordinarystandardsbyreasonofvice。

Ofthiskindofdisposition，however，wemustlatermakesomemention，whilewehavediscussedvicebeforewemustnowdiscussincontinenceandsoftness(oreffeminacy)，andcontinenceandendurance；forwemusttreateachofthetwoneitherasidenticalwithvirtueorwickedness，norasadifferentgenus。Wemust，asinallothercases，settheobservedfactsbeforeusand，afterfirstdiscussingthedifficulties，goontoprove，ifpossible，thetruthofallthecommonopinionsabouttheseaffectionsofthemind，or，failingthis，ofthegreaternumberandthemostauthoritative；forifwebothrefutetheobjectionsandleavethecommonopinionsundisturbed，weshallhaveprovedthecasesufficiently。

Now(1)bothcontinenceandendurancearethoughttobeincludedamongthingsgoodandpraiseworthy，andbothincontinenceandsoft，nessamongthingsbadandblameworthy；andthesamemanisthoughttobecontinentandreadytoabidebytheresultofhiscalculations，orincontinentandreadytoabandonthem。And(2)theincontinentman，knowingthatwhathedoesisbad，doesitasaresultofpassion，whilethecontinentman，knowingthathisappetitesarebad，refusesonaccountofhisrationalprincipletofollowthem(3)

Thetemperatemanallmencallcontinentanddisposedtoendurance，whilethecontinentmansomemaintaintobealwaystemperatebutothersdonot；andsomecalltheself-indulgentmanincontinentandtheincontinentmanselfindulgentindiscriminately，whileothersdistinguishthem。(4)Themanofpracticalwisdom，theysometimessay，cannotbeincontinent，whilesometimestheysaythatsomewhoarepracticallywiseandcleverareincontinent。Again(5)menaresaidtobeincontinentevenwithrespecttoanger，honour，andgain-These，then，arethethingsthataresaid。

Nowwemayask(1)howamanwhojudgesrightlycanbehaveincontinently。Thatheshouldbehavesowhenhehasknowledge，somesayisimpossible；foritwouldbestrange-soSocratesthought-ifwhenknowledgewasinamansomethingelsecouldmasteritanddragitaboutlikeaslave。ForSocrateswasentirelyopposedtotheviewinquestion，holdingthatthereisnosuchthingasincontinence；noone，hesaid，whenhejudgesactsagainstwhathejudgesbest-peopleactsoonlybyreasonofignorance。Nowthisviewplainlycontradictstheobservedfacts，andwemustinquireaboutwhathappenstosuchaman；ifheactsbyreasonofignorance，whatisthemannerofhisignorance？Forthatthemanwhobehavesincontinentlydoesnot，beforehegetsintothisstate，thinkheoughttoactso，isevident。ButtherearesomewhoconcedecertainofSocrates\'contentionsbutnotothers；thatnothingisstrongerthanknowledgetheyadmit，butnotthatononeactscontrarytowhathasseemedtohimthebettercourse，andthereforetheysaythattheincontinentmanhasnotknowledgewhenheismasteredbyhispleasures，butopinion。Butifitisopinionandnotknowledge，ifitisnotastrongconvictionthatresistsbutaweakone，asinmenwhohesitate，wesympathizewiththeirfailuretostandbysuchconvictionsagainststrongappetites；butwedonotsympathizewithwickedness，norwithanyoftheotherblameworthystates。Isitthenpracticalwisdomwhoseresistanceismastered？Thatisthestrongestofallstates。Butthisisabsurd；thesamemanwillbeatoncepracticallywiseandincontinent，butnoonewouldsaythatitisthepartofapracticallywisemantodowillinglythebasestacts。Besides，ithasbeenshownbeforethatthemanofpracticalwisdomisonewhowillact(forheisamanconcernedwiththeindividualfacts)andwhohastheothervirtues。

(2)Further，ifcontinenceinvolveshavingstrongandbadappetites，thetemperatemanwillnotbecontinentnorthecontinentmantemperate；foratemperatemanwillhaveneitherexcessivenorbadappetites。Butthecontinentmanmust；foriftheappetitesaregood，thestateofcharacterthatrestrainsusfromfollowingthemisbad，sothatnotallcontinencewillbegood；whileiftheyareweakandnotbad，thereisnothingadmirableinresistingthem，andiftheyareweakandbad，thereisnothinggreatinresistingtheseeither。

(3)Further，ifcontinencemakesamanreadytostandbyanyandeveryopinion，itisbad，i。e。ifitmakeshimstandevenbyafalseopinion；andifincontinencemakesamanapttoabandonanyandeveryopinion，therewillbeagoodincontinence，ofwhichSophocles\'NeoptolemusinthePhilocteteswillbeaninstance；forheistobepraisedfornotstandingbywhatOdysseuspersuadedhimtodo，becauseheispainedattellingalie。

(4)Further，thesophisticargumentpresentsadifficulty；thesyllogismarisingfrommen\'swishtoexposeparadoxicalresultsarisingfromanopponent\'sview，inorderthattheymaybeadmiredwhentheysucceed，isonethatputsusinadifficulty(forthoughtisboundfastwhenitwillnotrestbecausetheconclusiondoesnotsatisfyit，andcannotadvancebecauseitcannotrefutetheargument)。

Thereisanargumentfromwhichitfollowsthatfollycoupledwithincontinenceisvirtue；foramandoestheoppositeofwhathejudges，owingtoincontinence，butjudgeswhatisgoodtobeevilandsomethingthatheshouldnotdo，andconsequencehewilldowhatisgoodandnotwhatisevil。

(5)Further，hewhoonconvictiondoesandpursuesandchooseswhatispleasantwouldbethoughttobebetterthanonewhodoessoasaresultnotofcalculationbutofincontinence；forheiseasiertocuresincehemaybepersuadedtochangehismind。Buttotheincontinentmanmaybeappliedtheproverb\'whenwaterchokes，whatisonetowashitdownwith？\'Ifhehadbeenpersuadedoftherightnessofwhathedoes，hewouldhavedesistedwhenhewaspersuadedtochangehismind；butnowheactsinspiteofhisbeingpersuadedofsomethingquitedifferent。

(6)Further，ifincontinenceandcontinenceareconcernedwithanyandeverykindofobject，whoisitthatisincontinentintheunqualifiedsense？Noonehasalltheformsofincontinence，butwesaysomepeopleareincontinentwithoutqualification。

Ofsomesuchkindarethedifficultiesthatarise；someofthesepointsmustberefutedandtheothersleftinpossessionofthefield；

forthesolutionofthedifficultyisthediscoveryofthetruth。

(1)Wemustconsiderfirst，then，whetherincontinentpeopleactknowinglyornot，andinwhatsenseknowingly；then(2)withwhatsortsofobjecttheincontinentandthecontinentmanmaybesaidtobeconcerned(i。e。whetherwithanyandeverypleasureandpainorwithcertaindeterminatekinds)，andwhetherthecontinentmanandthemanofendurancearethesameordifferent；andsimilarlywithregardtotheothermattersgermanetothisinquiry。Thestarting-pointofourinvestigationis(a)thequestionwhetherthecontinentmanandtheincontinentaredifferentiatedbytheirobjectsorbytheirattitude，i。e。whethertheincontinentmanisincontinentsimplybybeingconcernedwithsuchandsuchobjects，or，instead，byhisattitude，or，insteadofthat，byboththesethings；(b)thesecondquestioniswhetherincontinenceandcontinenceareconcernedwithanyandeveryobjectornot。Themanwhoisincontinentintheunqualifiedsenseisneitherconcernedwithanyandeveryobject，butwithpreciselythosewithwhichtheself-indulgentmanisconcerned，norishecharacterizedbybeingsimplyrelatedtothese(forthenhisstatewouldbethesameasself-indulgence)，butbybeingrelatedtotheminacertainway。Fortheoneisledoninaccordancewithhisownchoice，thinkingthatheoughtalwaystopursuethepresentpleasure；whiletheotherdoesnotthinkso，butyetpursuesit。

(1)Asforthesuggestionthatitistrueopinionandnotknowledgeagainstwhichweactincontinently，thatmakesnodifferencetotheargument；forsomepeoplewheninastateofopiniondonothesitate，butthinktheyknowexactly。If，then，thenotionisthatowingtotheirweakconvictionthosewhohaveopinionaremorelikelytoactagainsttheirjudgementthanthosewhoknow，weanswerthatthereneedbenodifferencebetweenknowledgeandopinioninthisrespect；forsomemenarenolessconvincedofwhattheythinkthanothersofwhattheyknow；asisshownbytheofHeraclitus。But(a)，sinceweusetheword\'know\'intwosenses(forboththemanwhohasknowledgebutisnotusingitandhewhoisusingitaresaidtoknow)，itwillmakeadifferencewhether，whenamandoeswhatheshouldnot，hehastheknowledgebutisnotexercisingit，orisexercisingit；forthelatterseemsstrange，butnottheformer。

(b)Further，sincetherearetwokindsofpremisses，thereisnothingtopreventaman\'shavingbothpremissesandactingagainsthisknowledge，providedthatheisusingonlytheuniversalpremissandnottheparticular；foritisparticularactsthathavetobedone。Andtherearealsotwokindsofuniversalterm；oneispredicableoftheagent，theotheroftheobject；e。g。\'dryfoodisgoodforeveryman\'，and\'Iamaman\'，or\'suchandsuchfoodisdry\'；

butwhether\'thisfoodissuchandsuch\'，ofthistheincontinentmaneitherhasnotorisnotexercisingtheknowledge。Therewill，then，be，firstly，anenormousdifferencebetweenthesemannersofknowing，sothattoknowinonewaywhenweactincontinentlywouldnotseemanythingstrange，whiletoknowintheotherwaywouldbeextraordinary。

Andfurther(c)thepossessionofknowledgeinanothersensethanthosejustnamedissomethingthathappenstomen；forwithinthecaseofhavingknowledgebutnotusingitweseeadifferenceofstate，admittingofthepossibilityofhavingknowledgeinasenseandyetnothavingit，asintheinstanceofamanasleep，mad，ordrunk。

Butnowthisisjusttheconditionofmenundertheinfluenceofpassions；foroutburstsofangerandsexualappetitesandsomeothersuchpassions，itisevident，actuallyalterourbodilycondition，andinsomemenevenproducefitsofmadness。Itisplain，then，thatincontinentpeoplemustbesaidtobeinasimilarconditiontomenasleep，mad，ordrunk。Thefactthatmenusethelanguagethatflowsfromknowledgeprovesnothing；forevenmenundertheinfluenceofthesepassionsutterscientificproofsandversesofEmpedocles，andthosewhohavejustbeguntolearnasciencecanstringtogetheritsphrases，butdonotyetknowit；forithastobecomepartofthemselves，andthattakestime；sothatwemustsupposethattheuseoflanguagebymeninanincontinentstatemeansnomorethanitsutterancebyactorsonthestage。(d)Again，wemayalsoviewthecauseasfollowswithreferencetothefactsofhumannature。

Theoneopinionisuniversal，theotherisconcernedwiththeparticularfacts，andherewecometosomethingwithinthesphereofperception；whenasingleopinionresultsfromthetwo，thesoulmustinonetypeofcaseaffirmtheconclusion，whileinthecaseofopinionsconcernedwithproductionitmustimmediatelyact(e。g。if\'everythingsweetoughttobetasted\'，and\'thisissweet\'，inthesenseofbeingoneoftheparticularsweetthings，themanwhocanactandisnotpreventedmustatthesametimeactuallyactaccordingly)。When，then，theuniversalopinionispresentinusforbiddingustotaste，andthereisalsotheopinionthat\'everythingsweetispleasant\'，andthat\'thisissweet\'(nowthisistheopinionthatisactive)，andwhenappetitehappenstobepresentinus，theoneopinionbidsusavoidtheobject，butappetiteleadsustowardsit(foritcanmoveeachofourbodilyparts)；sothatitturnsoutthatamanbehavesincontinentlyundertheinfluence(inasense)ofaruleandanopinion，andofonenotcontraryinitself，butonlyincidentally-fortheappetiteiscontrary，nottheopinion-totherightrule。Italsofollowsthatthisisthereasonwhytheloweranimalsarenotincontinent，viz。becausetheyhavenouniversaljudgementbutonlyimaginationandmemoryofparticulars。

Theexplanationofhowtheignoranceisdissolvedandtheincontinentmanregainshisknowledge，isthesameasinthecaseofthemandrunkorasleepandisnotpeculiartothiscondition；wemustgotothestudentsofnaturalscienceforit。Now，thelastpremissbothbeinganopinionaboutaperceptibleobject，andbeingwhatdeterminesouractionsthisamaneitherhasnotwhenheisinthestateofpassion，orhasitinthesenseinwhichhavingknowledgedidnotmeanknowingbutonlytalking，asadrunkenmanmayuttertheversesofEmpedocles。Andbecausethelasttermisnotuniversalnorequallyanobjectofscientificknowledgewiththeuniversalterm，thepositionthatSocratessoughttoestablishactuallyseemstoresult；

foritisnotinthepresenceofwhatisthoughttobeknowledgeproperthattheaffectionofincontinencearises(norisitthisthatis\'draggedabout\'asaresultofthestateofpassion)，butinthatofperceptualknowledge。

Thismustsufficeasouranswertothequestionofactionwithandwithoutknowledge，andhowitispossibletobehaveincontinentlywithknowledge。

(2)Wemustnextdiscusswhetherthereisanyonewhoisincontinentwithoutqualification，orallmenwhoareincontinentaresoinaparticularsense，andifthereis，withwhatsortofobjectsheisconcerned。Thatbothcontinentpersonsandpersonsofendurance，andincontinentandsoftpersons，areconcernedwithpleasuresandpains，isevident。

Nowofthethingsthatproducepleasuresomearenecessary，whileothersareworthyofchoiceinthemselvesbutadmitofexcess，thebodilycausesofpleasurebeingnecessary(bysuchImeanboththoseconcernedwithfoodandthoseconcernedwithsexualintercourse，i。e。thebodilymatterswithwhichwedefinedself-indulgenceandtemperanceasbeingconcerned)，whiletheothersarenotnecessarybutworthyofchoiceinthemselves(e。g。victory，honour，wealth，andgoodandpleasantthingsofthissort)。Thisbeingso，(a)thosewhogotoexcesswithreferencetothelatter，contrarytotherightrulewhichisinthemselves，arenotcalledincontinentsimply，butincontinentwiththequalification\'inrespectofmoney，gain，honour，oranger\'，-notsimplyincontinent，onthegroundthattheyaredifferentfromincontinentpeopleandarecalledincontinentbyreasonofaresemblance。(ComparethecaseofAnthropos(Man)，whowonacontestattheOlympicgames；inhiscasethegeneraldefinitionofmandifferedlittlefromthedefinitionpeculiartohim，butyetitwasdifferent。)Thisisshownbythefactthatincontinenceeitherwithoutqualificationorinrespectofsomeparticularbodilypleasureisblamednotonlyasafaultbutasakindofvice，whilenoneofthepeoplewhoareincontinentintheseotherrespectsissoblamed。

But(b)ofthepeoplewhoareincontinentwithrespecttobodilyenjoyments，withwhichwesaythetemperateandtheself-indulgentmanareconcerned，hewhopursuestheexcessesofthingspleasant-andshunsthoseofthingspainful，ofhungerandthirstandheatandcoldandalltheobjectsoftouchandtaste-notbychoicebutcontrarytohischoiceandhisjudgement，iscalledincontinent，notwiththequalification\'inrespectofthisorthat\'，e。g。ofanger，butjustsimply。Thisisconfirmedbythefactthatmenarecalled\'soft\'

withregardtothesepleasures，butnotwithregardtoanyoftheothers。Andforthisreasonwegrouptogethertheincontinentandtheself-indulgent，thecontinentandthetemperateman-butnotanyoftheseothertypes-becausetheyareconcernedsomehowwiththesamepleasuresandpains；butthoughtheseareconcernedwiththesameobjects，theyarenotsimilarlyrelatedtothem，butsomeofthemmakeadeliberatechoicewhiletheothersdonot。

Thisiswhyweshoulddescribeasself-indulgentratherthemanwhowithoutappetiteorwithbutaslightappetitepursuestheexcessesofpleasureandavoidsmoderatepains，thanthemanwhodoessobecauseofhisstrongappetites；forwhatwouldtheformerdo，ifhehadinadditionavigorousappetite，andaviolentpainatthelackofthe\'necessary\'objects？

Nowofappetitesandpleasuressomebelongtotheclassofthingsgenericallynobleandgood-forsomepleasantthingsarebynatureworthyofchoice，whileothersarecontrarytothese，andothersareintermediate，toadoptourpreviousdistinction-e。g。wealth，gain，victory，honour。Andwithreferencetoallobjectswhetherofthisoroftheintermediatekindmenarenotblamedforbeingaffectedbythem，fordesiringandlovingthem，butfordoingsoinacertainway，i。e。forgoingtoexcess。(Thisiswhyallthosewhocontrarytotheruleeitheraremasteredbyorpursueoneoftheobjectswhicharenaturallynobleandgood，e。g。thosewhobusythemselvesmorethantheyoughtabouthonouroraboutchildrenandparents，(arenotwicked)；forthesetooaregood，andthosewhobusythemselvesaboutthemarepraised；butyetthereisanexcesseveninthem-iflikeNiobeoneweretofightevenagainstthegods，orweretobeasmuchdevotedtoone\'sfatherasSatyrusnicknamed\'thefilial\'，whowasthoughttobeverysillyonthispoint。)Thereisnowickedness，then，withregardtotheseobjects，forthereasonnamed，viz。becauseeachofthemisbynatureathingworthyofchoiceforitsownsake；

yetexcessesinrespectofthemarebadandtobeavoided。Similarlythereisnoincontinencewithregardtothem；forincontinenceisnotonlytobeavoidedbutisalsoathingworthyofblame；butowingtoasimilarityinthestateoffeelingpeopleapplythenameincontinence，addingineachcasewhatitisinrespectof，aswemaydescribeasabaddoctororabadactoronewhomweshouldnotcallbad，simply。As，then，inthiscasewedonotapplythetermwithoutqualificationbecauseeachoftheseconditionsisnoshadnessbutonlyanalogoustoit，soitisclearthatintheothercasealsothatalonemustbetakentobeincontinenceandcontinencewhichisconcernedwiththesameobjectsastemperanceandself-indulgence，butweapplythetermtoangerbyvirtueofaresemblance；andthisiswhywesaywithaqualification\'incontinentinrespectofanger\'aswesay\'incontinentinrespectofhonour，orofgain\'。

(1)Somethingsarepleasantbynature，andofthese(a)somearesowithoutqualification，and(b)othersaresowithreferencetoparticularclasseseitherofanimalsorofmen；while(2)othersarenotpleasantbynature，but(a)someofthembecomesobyreasonofinjuriestothesystem，and(b)othersbyreasonofacquiredhabits，and(c)othersbyreasonoforiginallybadnatures。Thisbeingso，itispossiblewithregardtoeachofthelatterkindstodiscoversimilarstatesofcharactertothoserecognizedwithregardtotheformer；Imean(A)thebrutishstates，asinthecaseofthefemalewho，theysay，ripsopenpregnantwomenanddevourstheinfants，orofthethingsinwhichsomeofthetribesabouttheBlackSeathathavegonesavagearesaidtodelight-inrawmeatorinhumanflesh，orinlendingtheirchildrentooneanothertofeastupon-orofthestorytoldofPhalaris。

Thesestatesarebrutish，but(B)othersariseasaresultofdisease(or，insomecases，ofmadness，aswiththemanwhosacrificedandatehismother，orwiththeslavewhoatetheliverofhisfellow)，andothersaremorbidstates(C)resultingfromcustom，e。g。thehabitofpluckingoutthehairorofgnawingthenails，orevencoalsorearth，andinadditiontothesepaederasty；fortheseariseinsomebynatureandinothers，asinthosewhohavebeenthevictimsoflustfromchildhood，fromhabit。

Nowthoseinwhomnatureisthecauseofsuchastatenoonewouldcallincontinent，anymorethanonewouldapplytheepithettowomenbecauseofthepassiveparttheyplayincopulation；norwouldoneapplyittothosewhoareinamorbidconditionasaresultofhabit。Tohavethesevarioustypesofhabitisbeyondthelimitsofvice，asbrutishnessistoo；foramanwhohasthemtomasterorbemasteredbythemisnotsimple(continenceor)incontinencebutthatwhichissobyanalogy，asthemanwhoisinthisconditioninrespectoffitsofangeristobecalledincontinentinrespectofthatfeelingbutnotincontinentsimply。Foreveryexcessivestatewhetheroffolly，ofcowardice，ofself-indulgence，orofbadtemper，iseitherbrutishormorbid；themanwhoisbynatureapttofeareverything，eventhesqueakofamouse，iscowardlywithabrutishcowardice，whilethemanwhofearedaweaseldidsoinconsequenceofdisease；andoffoolishpeoplethosewhobynaturearethoughtlessandlivebytheirsensesalonearebrutish，likesomeracesofthedistantbarbarians，whilethosewhoaresoasaresultofdisease(e。g。ofepilepsy)orofmadnessaremorbid。Ofthesecharacteristicsitispossibletohavesomeonlyattimes，andnottobemasteredbythem。e。g。Phalarismayhaverestrainedadesiretoeatthefleshofachildoranappetiteforunnaturalsexualpleasure；butitisalsopossibletobemastered，notmerelytohavethefeelings。Thus，asthewickednesswhichisonthehumanleveliscalledwickednesssimply，whilethatwhichisnotiscalledwickednessnotsimplybutwiththequalification\'brutish\'or\'morbid\'，inthesamewayitisplainthatsomeincontinenceisbrutishandsomemorbid，whileonlythatwhichcorrespondstohumanself-indulgenceisincontinencesimply。

Thatincontinenceandcontinence，then，areconcernedonlywiththesameobjectsasselfindulgenceandtemperanceandthatwhatisconcernedwithotherobjectsisatypedistinctfromincontinence，andcalledincontinencebyametaphorandnotsimply，isplain。

Thatincontinenceinrespectofangerislessdisgracefulthanthatinrespectoftheappetitesiswhatwewillnowproceedtosee。

(1)Angerseemstolistentoargumenttosomeextent，buttomishearit，asdohastyservantswhorunoutbeforetheyhaveheardthewholeofwhatonesays，andthenmuddletheorder，orasdogsbarkifthereisbutaknockatthedoor，beforelookingtoseeifitisafriend；soangerbyreasonofthewarmthandhastinessofitsnature，thoughithears，doesnothearanorder，andspringstotakerevenge。Forargumentorimaginationinformsusthatwehavebeeninsultedorslighted，andanger，reasoningasitwerethatanythinglikethismustbefoughtagainst，boilsupstraightway；whileappetite，ifargumentorperceptionmerelysaysthatanobjectispleasant，springstotheenjoymentofit。Thereforeangerobeystheargumentinasense，butappetitedoesnot。Itisthereforemoredisgraceful；forthemanwhoisincontinentinrespectofangerisinasenseconqueredbyargument，whiletheotherisconqueredbyappetiteandnotbyargument。

(2)Further，wepardonpeoplemoreeasilyforfollowingnaturaldesires，sincewepardonthemmoreeasilyforfollowingsuchappetitesasarecommontoallmen，andinsofarastheyarecommon；nowangerandbadtemperaremorenaturalthantheappetitesforexcess，i。e。forunnecessaryobjects。Takeforinstancethemanwhodefendedhimselfonthechargeofstrikinghisfatherbysaying\'yes，buthestruckhisfather，andhestruckhis，and\'(pointingtohischild)

\'thisboywillstrikemewhenheisaman；itrunsinthefamily\'；

orthemanwhowhenhewasbeingdraggedalongbyhissonbadehimstopatthedoorway，sincehehimselfhaddraggedhisfatheronlyasfarasthat。

(2)Further，thosewhoaremoregiventoplottingagainstothersaremorecriminal。Nowapassionatemanisnotgiventoplotting，norisangeritself-itisopen；butthenatureofappetiteisillustratedbywhatthepoetscallAphrodite，\'guile-weavingdaughterofCyprus\'，andbyHomer\'swordsabouther\'embroideredgirdle\':

Andthewhisperofwooingisthere，Whosesubtletystealeththewitsofthewise，howprudentsoe\'er。

Thereforeifthisformofincontinenceismorecriminalanddisgracefulthanthatinrespectofanger，itisbothincontinencewithoutqualificationandinasensevice。

(4)Further，noonecommitswantonoutragewithafeelingofpain，buteveryonewhoactsinangeractswithpain，whilethemanwhocommitsoutrageactswithpleasure。If，then，thoseactsatwhichitismostjusttobeangryaremorecriminalthanothers，theincontinencewhichisduetoappetiteisthemorecriminal；forthereisnowantonoutrageinvolvedinanger。

Plainly，then，theincontinenceconcernedwithappetiteismoredisgracefulthanthatconcernedwithanger，andcontinenceandincontinenceareconcernedwithbodilyappetitesandpleasures；butwemustgraspthedifferencesamongthelatterthemselves。For，ashasbeensaidatthebeginning，somearehumanandnaturalbothinkindandinmagnitude，othersarebrutish，andothersareduetoorganicinjuriesanddiseases。Onlywiththefirstofthesearetemperanceandself-indulgenceconcerned；thisiswhywecalltheloweranimalsneithertemperatenorself-indulgentexceptbyametaphor，andonlyifsomeoneraceofanimalsexceedsanotherasawholeinwantonness，destructiveness，andomnivorousgreed；thesehavenopowerofchoiceorcalculation，buttheyaredeparturesfromthenaturalnorm，as，amongmen，madmenare。Nowbrutishnessisalessevilthanvice，thoughmorealarming；foritisnotthatthebetterparthasbeenperverted，asinman，-theyhavenobetterpart。Thusitislikecomparingalifelessthingwithalivinginrespectofbadness；forthebadnessofthatwhichhasnooriginativesourceofmovementisalwayslesshurtful，andreasonisanoriginativesource。Thusitislikecomparinginjusticeintheabstractwithanunjustman。Eachisinsomesenseworse；forabadmanwilldotenthousandtimesasmuchevilasabrute。

Withregardtothepleasuresandpainsandappetitesandaversionsarisingthroughtouchandtaste，towhichbothself-indulgenceandtemperancewereformerlynarroweddown，itpossibletobeinsuchastateastobedefeatedevenbythoseofthemwhichmostpeoplemaster，ortomastereventhosebywhichmostpeoplearedefeated；

amongthesepossibilities，thoserelatingtopleasuresareincontinenceandcontinence，thoserelatingtopainssoftnessandendurance。Thestateofmostpeopleisintermediate，eveniftheyleanmoretowardstheworsestates。

Now，sincesomepleasuresarenecessarywhileothersarenot，andarenecessaryuptoapointwhiletheexcessesofthemarenot，northedeficiencies，andthisisequallytrueofappetitesandpains，themanwhopursuestheexcessesofthingspleasant，orpursuestoexcessnecessaryobjects，anddoessobychoice，fortheirownsakeandnotatallforthesakeofanyresultdistinctfromthem，isself-indulgent；forsuchamanisofnecessityunlikelytorepent，andthereforeincurable，sinceamanwhocannotrepentcannotbecured。

Themanwhoisdeficientinhispursuitofthemistheoppositeofself-indulgent；themanwhoisintermediateistemperate。Similarly，thereisthemanwhoavoidsbodilypainsnotbecauseheisdefeatedbythembutbychoice。(Ofthosewhodonotchoosesuchacts，onekindofmanisledtothemasaresultofthepleasureinvolved，anotherbecauseheavoidsthepainarisingfromtheappetite，sothatthesetypesdifferfromoneanother。Nowanyonewouldthinkworseofamanwithnoappetiteorwithweakappetitewerehetodosomethingdisgraceful，thanifhediditundertheinfluenceofpowerfulappetite，andworseofhimifhestruckablownotinangerthanifhediditinanger；forwhatwouldhehavedoneifhehadbeenstronglyaffected？Thisiswhytheself-indulgentmanisworsethantheincontinent。)ofthestatesnamed，then，thelatterisratherakindofsoftness；theformerisself-indulgence。Whiletotheincontinentmanisopposedthecontinent，tothesoftisopposedthemanofendurance；forenduranceconsistsinresisting，whilecontinenceconsistsinconquering，andresistingandconqueringaredifferent，asnotbeingbeatenisdifferentfromwinning；thisiswhycontinenceisalsomoreworthyofchoicethanendurance。Nowthemanwhoisdefectiveinrespectofresistancetothethingswhichmostmenbothresistandresistsuccessfullyissoftandeffeminate；foreffeminacytooisakindofsoftness；suchamantrailshiscloaktoavoidthepainofliftingit，andplaystheinvalidwithoutthinkinghimselfwretched，thoughthemanheimitatesisawretchedman。

Thecaseissimilarwithregardtocontinenceandincontinence。

Forifamanisdefeatedbyviolentandexcessivepleasuresorpains，thereisnothingwonderfulinthat；indeedwearereadytopardonhimifhehasresisted，asTheodectes\'Philoctetesdoeswhenbittenbythesnake，orCarcinus\'CercyonintheAlope，andaspeoplewhotrytorestraintheirlaughterburstoutintoaguffaw，ashappenedtoXenophantus。Butitissurprisingifamanisdefeatedbyandcannotresistpleasuresorpainswhichmostmencanholdoutagainst，whenthisisnotduetoheredityordisease，likethesoftnessthatishereditarywiththekingsoftheScythians，orthatwhichdistinguishesthefemalesexfromthemale。

Theloverofamusement，too，isthoughttobeself-indulgent，butisreallysoft。Foramusementisarelaxation，sinceitisarestfromwork；andtheloverofamusementisoneofthepeoplewhogotoexcessinthis。

Ofincontinenceonekindisimpetuosity，anotherweakness。Forsomemenafterdeliberatingfail，owingtotheiremotion，tostandbytheconclusionsoftheirdeliberation，othersbecausetheyhavenotdeliberatedareledbytheiremotion；sincesomemen(justaspeoplewhofirsttickleothersarenottickledthemselves)，iftheyhavefirstperceivedandseenwhatiscomingandhavefirstrousedthemselvesandtheircalculativefaculty，arenotdefeatedbytheiremotion，whetheritbepleasantorpainful。Itiskeenandexcitablepeoplethatsufferespeciallyfromtheimpetuousformofincontinence；

fortheformerbyreasonoftheirquicknessandthelatterbyreasonoftheviolenceoftheirpassionsdonotawaittheargument，becausetheyareapttofollowtheirimagination。

Theself-indulgentman，aswassaid，isnotapttorepent；forhestandsbyhischoice；butincontinentmanislikelytorepent。Thisiswhythepositionisnotasitwasexpressedintheformulationoftheproblem，buttheselfindulgentmanisincurableandtheincontinentmancurable；forwickednessislikeadiseasesuchasdropsyorconsumption，whileincontinenceislikeepilepsy；theformerisapermanent，thelatteranintermittentbadness。Andgenerallyincontinenceandvicearedifferentinkind；viceisunconsciousofitself，incontinenceisnot(ofincontinentmenthemselves，thosewhobecometemporarilybesidethemselvesarebetterthanthosewhohavetherationalprinciplebutdonotabidebyit，sincethelatteraredefeatedbyaweakerpassion，anddonotactwithoutpreviousdeliberationliketheothers)；fortheincontinentmanislikethepeoplewhogetdrunkquicklyandonlittlewine，i。e。onlessthanmostpeople。

Evidently，then，incontinenceisnotvice(thoughperhapsitissoinaqualifiedsense)；forincontinenceiscontrarytochoicewhileviceisinaccordancewithchoice；notbutwhattheyaresimilarinrespectoftheactionstheyleadto；asinthesayingofDemodocusabouttheMilesians，\'theMilesiansarenotwithoutsense，buttheydothethingsthatsenselesspeopledo\'，sotooincontinentpeoplearenotcriminal，buttheywilldocriminalacts。

Now，sincetheincontinentmanisapttopursue，notonconviction，bodilypleasuresthatareexcessiveandcontrarytotherightrule，whiletheself-indulgentmanisconvincedbecauseheisthesortofmantopursuethem，itisonthecontrarytheformerthatiseasilypersuadedtochangehismind，whilethelatterisnot。Forvirtueandvicerespectivelypreserveanddestroythefirstprinciple，andinactionsthefinalcauseisthefirstprinciple，asthehypothesesareinmathematics；neitherinthatcaseisitargumentthatteachesthefirstprinciples，norisitsohere-virtueeithernaturalorproducedbyhabituationiswhatteachesrightopinionaboutthefirstprinciple。Suchamanasthis，then，istemperate；hiscontraryistheself-indulgent。

Butthereisasortofmanwhoiscarriedawayasaresultofpassionandcontrarytotherightrule-amanwhompassionmasterssothathedoesnotactaccordingtotherightrule，butdoesnotmastertotheextentofmakinghimreadytobelievethatheoughttopursuesuchpleasureswithoutreserve；thisistheincontinentman，whoisbetterthantheself-indulgentman，andnotbadwithoutqualification；forthebestthinginhim，thefirstprinciple，ispreserved。Andcontrarytohimisanotherkindofman，hewhoabidesbyhisconvictionsandisnotcarriedaway，atleastasaresultofpassion。Itisevidentfromtheseconsiderationsthatthelatterisagoodstateandtheformerabadone。

Isthemancontinentwhoabidesbyanyandeveryruleandanyandeverychoice，orthemanwhoabidesbytherightchoice，andisheincontinentwhoabandonsanyandeverychoiceandanyandeveryrule，orhewhoabandonstherulethatisnotfalseandthechoicethatisright；thisishowweputitbeforeinourstatementoftheproblem。Orisitincidentallyanyandeverychoicebutpersethetrueruleandtherightchoicebywhichtheoneabidesandtheotherdoesnot？Ifanyonechoosesorpursuesthisforthesakeofthat，persehepursuesandchoosesthelatter，butincidentallytheformer。Butwhenwespeakwithoutqualificationwemeanwhatisperse。

Thereforeinasensetheoneabidesby，andtheotherabandons，anyandeveryopinion；butwithoutqualification，thetrueopinion。

Therearesomewhoareapttoabidebytheiropinion，whoarecalledstrong-headed，viz。thosewhoarehardtopersuadeinthefirstinstanceandarenoteasilypersuadedtochange；thesehaveinthemsomethinglikethecontinentman，astheprodigalisinawayliketheliberalmanandtherashmanliketheconfidentman；buttheyaredifferentinmanyrespects。Foritistopassionandappetitethattheonewillnotyield，sinceonoccasionthecontinentmanwillbeeasytopersuade；butitistoargumentthattheothersrefusetoyield，fortheydoformappetitesandmanyofthemareledbytheirpleasures。Nowthepeoplewhoarestrong-headedaretheopinionated，theignorant，andtheboorish-theopinionatedbeinginfluencedbypleasureandpain；fortheydelightinthevictorytheygainiftheyarenotpersuadedtochange，andarepainediftheirdecisionsbecomenullandvoidasdecreessometimesdo；sothattheyarelikertheincontinentthanthecontinentman。

Buttherearesomewhofailtoabidebytheirresolutions，notasaresultofincontinence，e。g。NeoptolemusinSophocles\'

Philoctetes；yetitwasforthesakeofpleasurethathedidnotstandfast-butanoblepleasure；fortellingthetruthwasnobletohim，buthehadbeenpersuadedbyOdysseustotellthelie。Fornoteveryonewhodoesanythingforthesakeofpleasureiseitherself-indulgentorbadorincontinent，buthewhodoesitforadisgracefulpleasure。

Sincethereisalsoasortofmanwhotakeslessdelightthanheshouldinbodilythings，anddoesnotabidebytherule，hewhoisintermediatebetweenhimandtheincontinentmanisthecontinentman；

fortheincontinentmanfailstoabidebytherulebecausehedelightstoomuchinthem，andthismanbecausehedelightsinthemtoolittle；

whilethecontinentmanabidesbytheruleanddoesnotchangeoneitheraccount。Nowifcontinenceisgood，boththecontrarystatesmustbebad，astheyactuallyappeartobe；butbecausetheotherextremeisseeninfewpeopleandseldom，astemperanceisthoughttobecontraryonlytoself-indulgence，soiscontinencetoincontinence。

Sincemanynamesareappliedanalogically，itisbyanalogythatwehavecometospeakofthe\'continence\'thetemperateman；forboththecontinentmanandthetemperatemanaresuchastodonothingcontrarytotheruleforthesakeofthebodilypleasures，buttheformerhasandthelatterhasnotbadappetites，andthelatterissuchasnottofeelpleasurecontrarytotherule，whiletheformerissuchastofeelpleasurebutnottobeledbyit。Andtheincontinentandtheself-indulgentmanarealsolikeanother；theyaredifferent，butbothpursuebodilypleasures-thelatter，however，alsothinkingthatheoughttodoso，whiletheformerdoesnotthinkthis。

Norcanthesamemanhavepracticalwisdomandbeincontinent；forithasbeenshown\'thatamanisatthesametimepracticallywise，andgoodinrespectofcharacter。Further，amanhaspracticalwisdomnotbyknowingonlybutbybeingabletoact；buttheincontinentmanisunabletoact-thereis，however，nothingtopreventaclevermanfrombeingincontinent；thisiswhyitissometimesactuallythoughtthatsomepeoplehavepracticalwisdombutareincontinent，viz。becauseclevernessandpracticalwisdomdifferinthewaywehavedescribedinourfirstdiscussions，andareneartogetherinrespectoftheirreasoning，butdifferinrespectoftheirpurpose-noryetistheincontinentmanlikethemanwhoknowsandiscontemplatingatruth，butlikethemanwhoisasleepordrunk。Andheactswillingly(forheactsinasensewithknowledgebothofwhathedoesandoftheendtowhichhedoesit)，butisnotwicked，sincehispurposeisgood；sothatheishalf-wicked。Andheisnotacriminal；forhedoesnotactofmaliceaforethought；ofthetwotypesofincontinentmantheonedoesnotabidebytheconclusionsofhisdeliberation，whiletheexcitablemandoesnotdeliberateatall。Andthustheincontinentmanlikeacitywhichpassesalltherightdecreesandhasgoodlaws，butmakesnouseofthem，asinAnaxandrides\'jestingremark，Thecitywilledit，thatcaresnoughtforlaws；

butthewickedmanislikeacitythatusesitslaws，buthaswickedlawstouse。

Nowincontinenceandcontinenceareconcernedwiththatwhichisinexcessofthestatecharacteristicofmostmen；forthecontinentmanabidesbyhisresolutionsmoreandtheincontinentmanlessthanmostmencan。

Oftheformsofincontinence，thatofexcitablepeopleismorecurablethanthatofthosewhodeliberatebutdonotabidebytheirdecisions，andthosewhoareincontinentthroughhabituationaremorecurablethanthoseinwhomincontinenceisinnate；foritiseasiertochangeahabitthantochangeone\'snature；evenhabitishardtochangejustbecauseitislikenature，asEvenussays:

Isaythathabit\'sbutalongpractice，friend，Andthisbecomesmen\'snatureintheend。

Wehavenowstatedwhatcontinence，incontinence，endurance，andsoftnessare，andhowthesestatesarerelatedtoeachother。

Thestudyofpleasureandpainbelongstotheprovinceofthepoliticalphilosopher；forheisthearchitectoftheend，withaviewtowhichwecallonethingbadandanothergoodwithoutqualification。

Further，itisoneofournecessarytaskstoconsiderthem；fornotonlydidwelayitdownthatmoralvirtueandviceareconcernedwithpainsandpleasures，butmostpeoplesaythathappinessinvolvespleasure；thisiswhytheblessedmaniscalledbyanamederivedfromawordmeaningenjoyment。

Now(1)somepeoplethinkthatnopleasureisagood，eitherinitselforincidentally，sincethegoodandpleasurearenotthesame；(2)othersthinkthatsomepleasuresaregoodbutthatmostarebad。(3)Againthereisathirdview，thatevenifallpleasuresaregood，yetthebestthingintheworldcannotbepleasure。(1)

Thereasonsgivenfortheviewthatpleasureisnotagoodatallare(a)thateverypleasureisaperceptibleprocesstoanaturalstate，andthatnoprocessisofthesamekindasitsend，e。g。noprocessofbuildingofthesamekindasahouse。(b)Atemperatemanavoidspleasures。(c)Amanofpracticalwisdompursueswhatisfreefrompain，notwhatispleasant。(d)Thepleasuresareahindrancetothought，andthemoresothemoreonedelightsinthem，e。g。insexualpleasure；fornoonecouldthinkofanythingwhileabsorbedinthis。(e)Thereisnoartofpleasure；buteverygoodistheproductofsomeart。(f)Childrenandthebrutespursuepleasures。(2)

Thereasonsfortheviewthatnotallpleasuresaregoodarethat(a)therearepleasuresthatareactuallybaseandobjectsofreproach，and(b)thereareharmfulpleasures；forsomepleasantthingsareunhealthy。(3)Thereasonfortheviewthatthebestthingintheworldisnotpleasureisthatpleasureisnotanendbutaprocess。

Theseareprettymuchthethingsthataresaid。Thatitdoesnotfollowfromthesegroundsthatpleasureisnotagood，oreventhechiefgood，isplainfromthefollowingconsiderations。(A)(a)First，sincethatwhichisgoodmaybesoineitheroftwosenses(onethinggoodsimplyandanothergoodforaparticularperson)，naturalconstitutionsandstatesofbeing，andthereforealsothecorrespondingmovementsandprocesses，willbecorrespondinglydivisible。Ofthosewhicharethoughttobebadsomewillbebadiftakenwithoutqualificationbutnotbadforaparticularperson，butworthyofhischoice，andsomewillnotbeworthyofchoiceevenforaparticularperson，butonlyataparticulartimeandforashortperiod，thoughnotwithoutqualification；whileothersarenotevenpleasures，butseemtobeso，viz。allthosewhichinvolvepainandwhoseendiscurative，e。g。theprocessesthatgooninsickpersons。

(b)Further，onekindofgoodbeingactivityandanotherbeingstate，theprocessesthatrestoreustoournaturalstateareonlyincidentallypleasant；forthatmattertheactivityatworkintheappetitesforthemistheactivityofsomuchofourstateandnatureashasremainedunimpaired；forthereareactuallypleasuresthatinvolvenopainorappetite(e。g。thoseofcontemplation)，thenatureinsuchacasenotbeingdefectiveatall。Thattheothersareincidentalisindicatedbythefactthatmendonotenjoythesamepleasantobjectswhentheirnatureisinitssettledstateastheydowhenitisbeingreplenished，butintheformercasetheyenjoythethingsthatarepleasantwithoutqualification，inthelatterthecontrariesoftheseaswell；forthentheyenjoyevensharpandbitterthings，noneofwhichispleasanteitherbynatureorwithoutqualification。Thestatestheyproduce，therefore，arenotpleasuresnaturallyorwithoutqualification；foraspleasantthingsdiffer，sodothepleasuresarisingfromthem。

(c)Again，itisnotnecessarythatthereshouldbesomethingelsebetterthanpleasure，assomesaytheendisbetterthantheprocess；forleasuresarenotprocessesnordotheyallinvolveprocess-theyareactivitiesandends；nordotheyarisewhenwearebecomingsomething，butwhenweareexercisingsomefaculty；andnotallpleasureshaveanenddifferentfromthemselves，butonlythepleasuresofpersonswhoarebeingledtotheperfectingoftheirnature。Thisiswhyitisnotrighttosaythatpleasureisperceptibleprocess，butitshouldratherbecalledactivityofthenaturalstate，andinsteadof\'perceptible\'\'unimpeded\'。Itisthoughtbysomepeopletobeprocessjustbecausetheythinkitisinthestrictsensegood；fortheythinkthatactivityisprocess，whichitisnot。

(B)Theviewthatpleasuresarebadbecausesomepleasantthingsareunhealthyislikesayingthathealthythingsarebadbecausesomehealthythingsarebadformoney-making；botharebadintherespectmentioned，buttheyarenotbadforthatreason-indeed，thinkingitselfissometimesinjurioustohealth。

Neitherpracticalwisdomnoranystateofbeingisimpededbythepleasurearisingfromit；itisforeignpleasuresthatimpede，forthepleasuresarisingfromthinkingandlearningwillmakeusthinkandlearnallthemore。

(C)Thefactthatnopleasureistheproductofanyartarisesnaturallyenough；thereisnoartofanyotheractivityeither，butonlyofthecorrespondingfaculty；thoughforthatmattertheartsoftheperfumerandthecookarethoughttobeartsofpleasure。

(D)Theargumentsbasedonthegroundsthatthetemperatemanavoidspleasureandthatthemanofpracticalwisdompursuesthepainlesslife，andthatchildrenandthebrutespursuepleasure，areallrefutedbythesameconsideration。Wehavepointedoutinwhatsensepleasuresaregoodwithoutqualificationandinwhatsensesomearenotgood；nowboththebrutesandchildrenpursuepleasuresofthelatterkind(andthemanofpracticalwisdompursuestranquilfreedomfromthatkind)，viz。thosewhichimplyappetiteandpain，i。e。thebodilypleasures(foritisthesethatareofthisnature)

andtheexcessesofthem，inrespectofwhichtheself-indulgentmanisself-indulent。Thisiswhythetemperatemanavoidsthesepleasures；forevenhehaspleasuresofhisown。

Butfurther(E)itisagreedthatpainisbadandtobeavoided；forsomepainiswithoutqualificationbad，andotherpainisbadbecauseitisinsomerespectanimpedimenttous。Nowthecontraryofthatwhichistobeavoided，quasomethingtobeavoidedandbad，isgood。Pleasure，then，isnecessarilyagood。FortheanswerofSpeusippus，thatpleasureiscontrarybothtopainandtogood，asthegreateriscontrarybothtothelessandtotheequal，isnotsuccessful；sincehewouldnotsaythatpleasureisessentiallyjustaspeciesofevil。

And(F)ifcertainpleasuresarebad，thatdoesnotpreventthechiefgoodfrombeingsomepleasure，justasthechiefgoodmaybesomeformofknowledgethoughcertainkindsofknowledgearebad。

Perhapsitisevennecessary，ifeachdispositionhasunimpededactivities，that，whethertheactivity(ifunimpeded)ofallourdispositionsorthatofsomeoneofthemishappiness，thisshouldbethethingmostworthyofourchoice；andthisactivityispleasure。

Thusthechiefgoodwouldbesomepleasure，thoughmostpleasuresmightperhapsbebadwithoutqualification。Andforthisreasonallmenthinkthatthehappylifeispleasantandweavepleasureintotheiridealofhappiness-andreasonablytoo；fornoactivityisperfectwhenitisimpeded，andhappinessisaperfectthing；thisiswhythehappymanneedsthegoodsofthebodyandexternalgoods，i。e。thoseoffortune，viz。inorderthathemaynotbeimpededintheseways。Thosewhosaythatthevictimontherackorthemanwhofallsintogreatmisfortunesishappyifheisgood，are，whethertheymeantoornot，talkingnonsense。Nowbecauseweneedfortuneaswellasotherthings，somepeoplethinkgoodfortunethesamethingashappiness；butitisnotthat，forevengoodfortuneitselfwheninexcessisanimpediment，andperhapsshouldthenbenolongercalledgoodfortune；foritslimitisfixedbyreferencetohappiness。

Andindeedthefactthatallthings，bothbrutesandmen，pursuepleasureisanindicationofitsbeingsomehowthechiefgood:

Novoiceiswhollylostthatmanypeoples……

Butsincenoonenatureorstateeitherisoristhoughtthebestforall，neitherdoallpursuethesamepleasure；yetallpursuepleasure。Andperhapstheyactuallypursuenotthepleasuretheythinktheypursuenorthatwhichtheywouldsaytheypursue，butthesamepleasure；forallthingshavebynaturesomethingdivineinthem。

Butthebodilypleasureshaveappropriatedthenamebothbecauseweofteneststeerourcourseforthemandbecauseallmenshareinthem；thusbecausetheyalonearefamiliar，menthinktherearenoothers。

Itisevidentalsothatifpleasure，i。e。theactivityofourfaculties，isnotagood，itwillnotbethecasethatthehappymanlivesapleasantlife；fortowhatendshouldheneedpleasure，ifitisnotagoodbutthehappymanmayevenliveapainfullife？Forpainisneitheranevilnoragood，ifpleasureisnot；whythenshouldheavoidit？Therefore，too，thelifeofthegoodmanwillnotbepleasanterthanthatofanyoneelse，ifhisactivitiesarenotmorepleasant。

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